Participation in a New Regulatory Paradigm: Collaboration and Constraint in TTIP's Regulatory Cooperation by Mendes, Joana
 
 
 
 
 
IILJ Working Paper 2016/5 
MegaReg Series 
 
 
 
 
 
Participation in a new regulatory paradigm: collaboration 
and constraint in TTIP’s regulatory cooperation 
 
Joana Mendes 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
MegaReg Project Directors Benedict Kingsbury & Richard B. Stewart 
MegaReg Fellows Paul Mertenskötter & Thomas Streinz 
Faculty Advisory Committee Philip Alston, José Alvarez, Eyal Benvenisti, Kevin 
Davis, Gráinne de Búrca, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Franco 
Ferrari, Robert Howse, Mattias Kumm, Linda 
Silberman, Richard Stewart & Joseph H. H. Weiler 
MegaReg Online megareg.iilj.org | @megareg_iilj 
 
Institute for International Law and Justice 
Wilf Hall, 139 MacDougal Street, 3rd Floor 
New York, NY 
www.iilj.org | @nyuiilj 
 
 
 
All rights reserved. 
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN: 1552-6275 
© Joana Mendes 
 
 
Working Papers are issued at the responsibility of their authors, and do not  
reflect views of NYU, the IILJ, or associated personnel.  
 
New York University School of Law 
New York, NY 10012 
U.S.A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Version of 1 June 2016 
 
 
Cite as: 
IILJ Working Paper 2016/5 
(MegaReg Series) 
Mendes                IILJ Working Paper 2016/4 (MegaReg Series) 
 
1 
 
 
PARTICIPATION IN A NEW REGULATORY PARADIGM: COLLABORATION AND 
CONSTRAINT IN TTIP’S REGULATORY COOPERATION 
Joana Mendes 
1. A classic theme in a new institutional setting 
Regulatory cooperation is a core aspect of mega-regional agreements in liberalizing trade and 
investment, as it enables the parties to bridge their regulatory divergences beyond what is defined in the 
text of the agreements. It relies on institutional and procedural structures that entail both the mutual 
adjustment of domestic procedures of the parties and new international fora where regulators meet to 
negotiate and deliberate. In the case of TTIP, regulatory cooperation will be the setting in which decisions 
will be prepared or made on the differences between EU and US regulation that could be usefully 
overcome; on the technical requirements that are unnecessarily duplicated; on the standards that should 
remain in place because they contend with public policy objectives in a way that would not be compatible 
with domestic standards; on the areas that are too distinct to justify attempts at mutual recognition or 
other forms of regulatory compatibility; on the standards that both parties will promote globally. 
This paper focuses on participation, which in addition to information exchanges and regulatory 
impact assessments, forms part of the trio of “good regulatory practices” that constitute the procedural 
basis of regulatory cooperation under TTIP.1 The academic discussion on participation in TTIP has 
revived interest in the comparison between the US notice and comment system and the EU institutional 
practices of consultation as largely shaped by the European Commission.2 From another angle, writings 
inspired on experimentalist approaches to regulation stress the importance of the involvement of 
stakeholders in the joint efforts of bridging the regulatory differences and regulatory gaps arising from 
domestic sector-focused regulation.3 This paper takes a different approach. Building on the potential 
transformative effects of regulatory cooperation under TTIP, it analyses the Janus-faced nature of 
participation to shed light on the ambiguity that the label “good regulatory practice” may conceal. The 
                                                 
 Associate Professor EU Law, University of Amsterdam (j.m.mendes@uva.nl). I am grateful to Paul Mertenskötter 
and Thomas Streinz for a fruitful discussion on some of the arguments made in this paper. 
1 European Commission, Textual proposal on “Good Regulatory Practices” tabled for discussion with the US in the 
negotiating round of February 2016 and made public on 21 March 2016, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154380.pdf [hereinafter EU Commission, Textual 
Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices]. Participation (as well as transparency) are also part of the Textual proposal 
on “Regulatory Cooperation” tabled for discussion with the US in the negotiating round of February 2016 and made 
public on 21 March 2016, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf 
[hereinafter EU Commission, Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation]. 
2 Richard Parker & Alberto Alemanno, Towards Effective Regulatory Cooperation under TTIP: Comparative Overview of the EU 
and US Legislative and Regulatory Systems (2014), available at www.ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/resources/; 
Reeve T. Bull, Public Participation and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 83 GEO. W. L. REV. 1262 (2015). 
For previous analyses, see Peter Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America Can Learn 
From Europe, and Vice Versa, 12 COLUMBIA J. OF EUROPEAN L. 645 (2006); Francesca Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in 
European Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 451 (1999). 
3 Bernard Hoekman, Trade Agreements and International Regulatory Cooperation in a Supply Chain World, EUI WORKING 
PAPER RSCAS 2015/14 [hereinafter Hoekman, Supply Chain World]. 
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ambiguity of participation is a classic theme in public law and political science studies.4 Nevertheless, the 
centrality of participation in an innovative scheme of regulation that may have far-reaching substantive 
and institutional impacts justifies yet another analysis. Depending on how it is designed and enforced, 
participation may contribute to the entrenchment of the power of regulators that participate in 
collaborative arrangements which may be detached from domestic constitutional strictures to a significant 
extent. At the same time, participation may be one means, among others, to constrain the authority of 
those regulators, by structuring their discretion in view of the public interests that they ought to pursue 
and protect. 
The analysis starts with a basic characterization of regulatory cooperation and of what it may 
entail. It discusses its ability to affect the legal spheres of those involved in trade of goods and services, as 
well as on the way diffuse interests are protected (Section 2). Both these effects and the possibility that 
regulatory cooperation may lead to a new regulatory paradigm justify a critical look at the institutional 
model of cooperation that is currently being discussed in the TTIP negotiations. A parallel drawn with the 
EU’s comitology system both stresses the normative concerns raised by a system of collaborative 
decision-making that needs to ensure sufficient conditions of negotiation and effective deliberation among 
regulators, and points to the possibilities of closure of the system (Section 3). Opportunities of 
participation – a core aspect of this institutional model – could prima facie deny or counter this possibility 
of closure (Section 4). Yet, such an effect will depend on the functions that participation is designed to 
fulfill, and on the way in which it will be practiced and enforced. Against this background, the paper 
contrasts the functional-instrumental perspective on participation endorsed in the textual proposals of the 
Commission on the TTIP’s chapters on regulatory cooperation and good regulatory practices with a 
political-legal perspective on participation. Quite apart from those who stress the importance of 
procedural design as a “precondition for realizing more substantial economic gains”,5 the paper claims 
that procedures of regulatory cooperation ought to be a means to ensure inclusiveness, equal access and 
public scrutiny, which the democratic conceptions of authority shared within the state would postulate.6 If 
approached in this way, participation may become a catalyst that facilitates a representation of the 
distributional effects of the outcomes of regulatory cooperation and gives voice to the affected interests 
that are protected by the legal orders which regulatory cooperation mobilizes. Participation could be a 
procedural element that would bind the authority of regulators to a composite legal framework, where the 
                                                 
4 Among many others, Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975) (for the US); DE-MYSTIFICATION OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: EU GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
(B. Kohler Koch & C. Quittkat, eds, 2013) (for the EU); Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory 
Governance: Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 211 (2014) [hereinafter Stewart, 
Remedying Disregard] (for global governance). 
5 Bernard Hoekman, Fostering Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and Gradual Multilateralization, 18 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 
609 (2015), at 611. 
6 On this premise, see Stewart, Remedying Disregard, supra note 4, at 212. See also, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?, 18 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 579 at 
586 (stressing the principles stated in Article 21(1) TEU). 
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legal orders of the parties are intertwined in an overarching legal structure set by the international 
agreement. There are considerable challenges to concretizing this political-legal approach to participation 
(Section 5). However, the potential transformative effects of regulatory cooperation, both in substantive 
and institutional terms, justify approaching participation as one means (among others) to constrain and 
structure the way authority is exercised via regulatory cooperation (Section 6). Regulatory cooperation 
under TTIP is the focus of the analysis. The arguments defended in this paper may nevertheless be 
pertinent in relation to other mega-regional agreements.7 
2. Regulatory cooperation, substantive effects and a new paradigm of regulation 
Regulatory cooperation encompasses various mechanisms through which two or more parties 
debate their divergences to align their regulatory requirements as far as feasible and desirable. In the 
context of mega-regional agreements, it deals with technical requirements that may create potentially 
protectionist barriers to trade. Yet, technical specifications set out in domestic rules also reflect the 
regulatory preferences prevalent in each jurisdiction. They are decided via decision-making procedures 
that channel those preferences and they are adopted insofar as they are deemed compatible with the 
respective political-legal framework. Moreover, regulatory cooperation has at least the ability to re-define 
the conditions in which goods are traded and services are provided, irrespective of its forms and of 
whether it may lead to weaker or stronger standards of protection of public goods. 8 The outcomes of 
regulatory cooperation may directly determine or influence the conditions of trade of goods and services. 
Changing those conditions, via the approximation of legal requirements, is the very purpose of regulatory 
cooperation within the framework of mega-regional agreements. To the extent that they are successful, the 
outcomes of such efforts affect the legal spheres of those involved in the respective trade chains 
(providers, intermediaries, consumers) and the conditions under which domestic regulators may protect 
public goods or facilitate their provision.  
Regulatory cooperation implies various degrees of approximation of the legal regimes involved, in 
a spectrum that ranges from a mere dialogue between regulators on their respective systems, on 
methodologies and techniques of regulation and supervision and enforcement, to harmonization.9 The 
                                                 
7 On international regulatory cooperation more broadly, see Reeve Bull et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory 
Cooperation: the Challenge of TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2015), at 8-
12. 
8 On the discussion on the level of protection, see, e.g., Don Elliot & Jacques Pelkmans, Greater TTIP Ambition in 
Chemicals: Why and How, CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance”, Paper No. 10 (2015); Simon Lester & Inu Barbee, 
The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 16 J. OF INT’L 
ECON. L 847 (2013), at 859 (who argue that the goal of establishing more compatible regulation is independent of 
weaker or stronger standards). See, also, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices, Article 
x1(2), which, by contrast to the Commission’s previous proposals, stresses the aim of improving the level of 
protection of public goods. 
9 On the various degrees and forms of regulatory cooperation, see Bull et al., supra note 7, at 10-12; Peter Chase & 
Jacques Pelkmans, This time it’s different: Turbo-charging regulatory cooperation in TTIP, CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the 
Balance”, Paper No. 7 (2015), at. 2-5. 
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Commission’s textual proposals on regulatory cooperation and good regulatory practices in TTIP cover 
this spectrum. Thus, the Commission proposes duties of cooperation prior to specific regulatory process 
(e.g. on research) and exchanges on various aspects of their respective practices of assessing impacts on 
international trade and investment and conducting retrospective evaluations.10 The Commission foresees 
specific duties of information exchange and indicates possible forms of promoting regulatory 
compatibility, including “mutual recognition of equivalence” of regulatory measures and harmonization.11 
The different forms that regulatory cooperation may take are not self-contained. While the more 
demanding and difficult stage of harmonization may never be reached, the process set in motion by 
regulatory cooperation in TTIP is intended to be of a “living nature” progressively leading to deeper 
forms of regulatory cooperation and, potentially, convergence.12 In this respect, even if the focus of 
regulatory cooperation may be on differences in standards and duplicative compliance requirements and 
not on domestic regulatory reform, it seems unlikely that, at least in the long run, regulatory cooperation 
will not re-define, to a minor or greater extent, the substantive requirements for the trading of goods and 
services in each jurisdiction.13 In addition to the substantive modification that may result from regulatory 
cooperation, the Commission’s textual proposal on good regulatory practices envisages procedural duties 
of both parties that would not only favor some degree of structural comparability between their domestic 
procedures (based on existing practices) but also set the foundations of regulatory cooperation activities 
(e.g. mutual recognition). Public information, stakeholder consultations, impact assessments and 
retrospective evaluations would serve both purposes.14 
In substantive terms, different degrees of regulatory divergences determine what cooperation may 
entail. Among other possibilities, it may lead to overcoming what are arguably minor differences not 
justified by the underlying policy objectives (e.g. the color of the neutral wire in electric circuits);15 to the 
recognition that different technical standards (maintained by each party) are equivalent in fulfilling the 
desired outcomes or public policy objectives, thereby avoiding duplicative tests and certification 
                                                 
10 Respectively, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x5(4) and EU Commission’s 
Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices, Articles 8(6) and 9(2). 
11 EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x5(1) 10(1). 
12 European Commission, Note for the Attention of the Trade Policy Committee: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
DG Trade, Unit E1, 20 June 2013.  
13 Possibly for this reason, some argue that trade agreements are not the right place for regulatory cooperation, see 
Lester & Barbee, supra note 8, at 859ff. 
14 See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal, Article 5 (early information), Article 6 (duty to consult); Article 7(2) (by 
which the parties “reaffirm their intention to carry out impact assessments”, but which also includes specific steps in 
conducting impact assessments that each Party “shall” incorporate in their domestic procedures.) 
15 See, Carl Martin Welcker, Why it’s so difficult for my company to sell to the US – and how TTIP could change all that, 19 
February 2016, EurActiv, available at  https://www.euractiv.com/section/all/opinion/publish-on-friday-why-its-so-
difficult-for-my-company-to-sell-to-the-us-and-how-ttip-could-change-all-that. 
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requirements; or to the acknowledgment that regulatory regimes, cultures and preferences are simply too 
divergent to engage in regulatory cooperation beyond the mere exchange of information and learning.16 
It follows that the extent to which the outcomes of regulatory cooperation may impact on the 
legal spheres of those concerned may differ significantly, depending on the level of regulatory cooperation 
achieved in each instance (as will their impact on the regulatory preferences that prevail in each 
jurisdiction). This caveat notwithstanding, insofar as regulatory cooperation may ultimately reduce the 
technical barriers to global trade chains, it will have distributional effects. It will potentially create 
advantageous positions for some – e.g. the European producers of car components, their suppliers, the 
workers of such companies, the safety and health of consumers if protection is thereby increased – and 
disadvantageous positions for others – e.g. other suppliers of car components and raw materials, their 
workers, the safety and health of consumers if protection is thereby decreased.  
Regulatory cooperation either facilitates or determines outcomes directed at changing the 
behavior of market operators and, in doing so, it may change the conditions under which diffuse interests 
are protected. It facilitates such outcomes via the exchange of information on the regulatory systems of 
each party, on their substantive rules and methodologies of regulation, and via the establishment of 
common procedural rules. It determines such outcomes if, for instance, it leads to the recognition of 
equivalence of the technical requirements. Such an assessment implies also a value judgment on the 
equivalence of the normative standards that grounded those technical requirements (e.g. to what extent do 
give technical specifications enable a suitable level of health protection?), as well as of the mechanisms of 
enforcement of each party.17 Regulatory cooperation may also evolve to modify the standards that each 
jurisdiction applies. While the current Commission’s proposal on regulatory cooperation specifies that 
such modification “shall aim at improving” the level of protection of public policy objectives, it is critical 
to assess the mechanisms that would be available to enforce possible breaches of this general requirement.  
Regulatory cooperation under mega-regional agreements may have additional far-reaching 
political, socio-economic and legal effects. It may generate a new paradigm of regulation in which 
regulation would be adjusted to the reality of global trade chains.18 Such model would overcome the 
regulatory segmentation typical of domestic settings and of the special-purpose global regulatory regimes 
that have emerged so far. Segmentation is pointed out as a cause of possibly unjustified obstacles to trade 
and investment and of coordination failures that generate health and consumer risks. For those who stress 
the disadvantages of segmentation, both the liberalization of trade and investment and the protection of 
public goods throughout the global trade chains could justify such a transition. Institutional and 
                                                 
16 On the benefits of learning through regulatory divergences, see Jonathan Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of 
International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 103 (2015). 
17 Hoekman, Supply Chain World, supra note 3, at 4-5.  
18 Ibid., at 6. 
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procedural design is core to this transformation. The following section will sketch the main lines of the 
TTIP’s model of regulatory cooperation, as reflected in the Commission’s textual proposal. 
3. Institutional model: collaborative decision-making among regulators 
Regulatory cooperation under TTIP is likely to rely on sectorial fora where regulators from the 
two jurisdictions meet or exchange information under the coordination and supervision of a central 
regulatory body.19 Whether the form is bilateral exchanges on regulatory objectives and approaches or 
more concrete initiatives leading to the examination of regulatory compatibility, regulatory authorities of 
both Parties will be defining what may or may not be reached via regulatory cooperation.20 The European 
Commission, on the EU side, and any federal rulemaking authority, on the side of the US,21 will be 
deciding which technical requirements are unnecessarily duplicated, and how health safety and other 
public policy goals would remain compatible with domestic standards. One could say that they continue at 
the international level the functions that they carry out internally. The Commission stresses that by 
maintaining the regulatory authorities of each party responsible for cooperation, by establishing basic 
duties of information exchanges and non-mandatory initiatives for regulatory compatibility, these new 
functions of regulatory authorities remain within their respective constitutional structures. Protecting 
“regulators’ autonomy” and maintaining cooperation in their hands is the option preferred by the 
Commission to avoid constitutional questions. Yet, even in this case, and depending on how the TTIP 
provisions will be implemented, it is likely that regulatory cooperation will strengthen the position of the 
domestic executive institutions and bodies at the central level (to use the terminology of the Commission’s 
proposal), which may raise concerns regarding the adequacy of internal accountability mechanisms.  
At any rate, the assumption is that regular and recurring exchanges between regulatory authorities 
fosters learning on their respective approaches and raises awareness to the possible trade implications of 
their regulatory requirements, thus overcoming the mutual lack of information and the mandate-based 
limitations of regulatory action (e.g. health, environment, etc.), in a way that would ultimately lead to 
breaking down existing barriers to trade.22 In one interpretation, the model should be one of 
                                                 
19 This was the structure delineated in a previous proposal on regulatory cooperation (Textual proposal on regulatory 
cooperation tabled for discussion with the US in the negotiating round of April 2015 and made public on 4 May 
2015 available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153403.pdf). While the specific 
institutional set up of regulatory cooperation under TTIP is still unclear, the Commission maintains that a 
“coordination structure” should be set up to oversee compliance with the rules on regulatory cooperation and 
facilitate its application. See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Annex (placeholder for 
provisions on the institutional set up for regulatory cooperation under TTIP). TPP and CETA have a similar basic 
structure. See, Trans Pacific Partnership (signed on 4 February 2016), Chapter 25, available at 
https://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text [hereinafter TPP]; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf [hereinafter CETA], Chapter 21. 
20 See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Articles x3(1)(b), x4(1) and (2) and x5(1). 
21 See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Articles x2(a). 
22 Hoekman, Supply Chain World, supra note 3, at 2-3 (stressing that “regulators generally do not think about the 
trade implications of what they do, but they are the owners of many of the policies that affect trade opportunities”).  
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experimentalist governance, which in the view of its proponents has the flexibility that the technical and 
dynamic character of regulation requires.23 Trust among regulators is largely seen to be a precondition of 
regulatory cooperation.24 While not explicitly mentioned in the current Commission’s textual proposal on 
TTIP, it is named as one of the objectives of regulatory cooperation in the CETA agreement and it 
appears in one of the official explanatory texts as one of the rationales of good regulatory practices.25 In 
TTIP, good regulatory practices – transparency, participation, impact assessments and retrospective 
evaluations – are a means of generating such trust (among other functions they also fulfill). As trust is 
built, it will create the basis for regulator-to-regulator agreements that bring further the liberalization 
preconized by TTIP, beyond its written provisions.26 It will be the basis to establish the “common 
interest”, which the Commission’s proposal indicates as a condition to engage in cooperation regarding 
aspects not ruled by TTIP, while still falling within its areas or sectors that the agreement covers.27 
This model of collaborative decision-making among peers, dependent on the progressive building 
of trust as regulators get acquainted with the regulatory system of the other Party, bears resemblances with 
practices of cooperation between regulators that have preceded mega-regional agreements. 28 The 
establishment of a central coordinating and supervisory body – a distinguishing feature of mega-regional 
agreements – does not break with, rather emphasizes, a model in which decision-making is in the hands of 
regulators. A parallel may be drawn with the committee structures that have underpinned the regulation of 
the internal market in the EU. A brief overview of some similarities and differences highlights the 
distinctive features of the regulatory structures that may emerge by force of TTIP and the normative 
concerns they entail. 
3.1. Legal-institutional embeddedness 
Comitology committees have enabled since the outset of integration “a dialogue at the 
administrative level between European and national civil servants”.29 Formally conceived as mechanisms 
that enable representatives of Member States’ administrations to control the Commission’s implementing 
powers (being thus at the core of institutional balance and struggles), these structures have been pivotal to 
                                                 
23 Hoekman, Supply Chain World, supra note 3, at 5. 
24 Elliot & Pelkmans, supra note 8, at 12. 
25 CETA, supra note 17, Article 21.3 (“build trust, deepen mutual understanding of regulatory governance and obtain 
from each other the benefit of expertise and perspectives…”). EU Commission, Good Regulatory Practices (GRPs) 
in TTIP. An Introduction to the EU’s revised proposal, 21 March 2016 (available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154381.pdf), p. 2. 
26 Chase & Pelkmans, supra note 9, at 12. 
27 See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x3(1)(b). 
28 See Debra P. Steger, Institutions for regulatory cooperation in 'new generation' economic and trade agreements, 39 LEGAL ISSUES 
OF ECON. INTEGRATION 109 (2012). Specifically, on previous practices of regulatory cooperation between the 
Commission and the US see, e.g., George Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation Between The European Commission And U.S. 
Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L. J. 933 (1996).   
29 Emile Noël, Comment fonctionnent les institutions de la Communauté Economique Européenne, 6 REVUE DU MARCHÉ 
COMMUN 14 (1973), at 20 (my translation).  
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the pooling of expertise and the mutual accommodation of the positions of national administrations. 
Throughout integration, they have functioned as “working [groups] [where] colleagues of different 
nationalities, representing different administrative traditions, meet in the spirit of mutual respect to agree 
on common solutions to their problems”.30 While often assumed to take decisions purely on the basis of 
technical and scientific expertise, research on comitology committees has pointed out the possible 
distributive effects of the outcomes they define as well as the socialization of their members in defining 
problems and shared approaches in a way that may impact on the preferences of their governments.31  
Comitology has been criticized for embodying power structures that subvert the formal settings 
that would guarantee equal representation of governments’ preferences, as well as for lack of transparency 
and of accountability mechanisms that would be commensurate to the actual policy discretion of 
committees.32 A lot has changed since the first calls for law to ensure that the common market would be 
responsive to broader normative concerns and that decision-making within committees would be 
transparent and accountable, notwithstanding the remaining shortcomings.33 The embeddedness of 
comitology in an institutional system composed also of representative institutions (the European 
Parliament and the Council) and of a court created the conditions to progressively adjust an administrative 
arrangement, which had been born out of functional necessity without much consideration to the impact 
it could have on existing institutional balances and guarantees. Comitology committees are subject to 
highly formalized procedures, to legal duties of proactive transparency, and to oversight by representative 
institutions.34 Irrespective of the criticisms one may direct at the effectiveness of control by the Parliament 
and at the interventions of the Court, the presence of these two institutions leaves the door open to 
institutional scrutiny and contestation of their powers. Accountability links to their national governments 
(which also have important weaknesses) add to parliamentary and judicial oversight.35 In addition, 
comitology committees are part of a legal-institutional system that, having evolved out of a project of 
market integration, is founded on democratic principles (Articles 9-12 TEU) and on constitutional values 
                                                 
30 Carl F. Bergström, COMITOLOGY: DELEGATION OF POWERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMITTEE 
SYSTEM (2005), at 32. 
31 Jürgen Neyer, The Comitology Challenge to Analytical Integration Theory, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, 
LAW AND POLITICS (C. Joerges and E. Vos, eds., 1999), at 226-8. 
32 On the insufficiencies of transparency, though referring to data of 2006, see Gijs Jan Brandsma, et al, How 
transparent are EU ‘Comitology’ committees in practice?”, 14 EUROPEAN L. J. 819 (2008). On the improvements on 
accountability, see, e.g. Christine Neuhold, Taming the ‘Trojan Horse’ of Comitology? Accountability issues of Comitology and the 
Role of the European Parliament, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 12 (2008), available at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2008-001.pdf. (stressing the multi-level gaps of accountability), see Gijs Jan Brandsma, 
Accounting for input in comitology committees: an uncomfortable silence, 17 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 487 
(2010). 
33 An influential example of such initial calls is the work led by Christian Joerges. See, e.g., Christian Joerges, 
Bureaucratic Nightmare, Technocratic Regime and the Dream of Good Transnational Governance, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL 
REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS (C. Joerges and E. Vos, eds., 1999), at 16. On transparency and accountability, see 
references cited in the footnote above. 
34 Thomas Christiansen & Mathias Dobbels, Non-Legislative Rule Making after the Lisbon Treaty: Implementing the New 
System of Comitology and Delegated Acts, 19 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 42 (2013); Neuhold, supra note 29; Brandsma, 
supra note 32. 
35 On the latter, see ibid. 
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(Article 2 TEU). These principles and values provide a normative yardstick of authority exercised via EU 
decision-making structures and outcomes in line with the constitutional traditions of Member States.36  
Transatlantic regulatory cooperation, by contrast, will be bound primarily by the provisions of an 
international agreement that, becoming in the EU an integral part of its legal order, defines a framework 
for the liberalization of trade and investment, even if heedful of other public policy objectives.37 As 
mentioned, in the current design the authority exercised via the outcomes of regulatory cooperation is 
largely in the hands of executive actors, sitting in working groups and in an overseeing central regulatory 
body. The reasons why executive actors are functionally suited to exercise the powers TTIP attributes 
them are well known, largely grounded on their functional expertise. Admittedly, the extent to which they 
will be constrained by internal constitutional strictures will largely depend on how the TTIP provisions on 
regulatory cooperation will be implemented. Yet, in a scenario in which they would act in a legal-
institutional setting where parliaments and courts would be deferent to the choices made in such fora, 
regulators would operate in a closed system (even if accountable to their peers), possibly disconnected 
from the domestic institutional frameworks that bind their action to democratic principles and 
constitutional values.38 Such a result would be normatively problematic in the constitutional systems of the 
parties.39  
At the time of the writing, it is still uncertain in which terms the outcomes of regulatory 
cooperation will be subject to parliamentary oversight and judicial review. The Commission’s proposal 
shows commitment to political accountability to legislators, stressing the importance of ensuring their 
“proper” involvement. Yet, for now, the involvement of parliaments in regulatory cooperation remains a 
placeholder in the Commission’s textual proposal.40 The details are unknown. The way these legal-
institutional links will be defined and implemented will arguably be decisive to the more or less closed 
nature of the system and to the establishment of avenues of scrutiny and contestation. The jurisdiction of 
domestic courts will depend on how and in which form decisions on regulatory cooperation will be made, 
and on clauses that may condition standing (e.g. provisions precluding direct effect). The Commission’s 
proposal of 2016 indicates that the regulatory authorities of both Parties will be adopting the legal 
                                                 
36 Even the Member States that now explicitly deviate from such traditions have signed the Lisbon Treaty where 
democratic principles and constitutional values are enshrined. 
37 See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x1. The objectives and general 
principles stated in this provision are drafted in broader terms than those that had been indicated in the previous 
Commission’s textual proposal and seek to emphasize the pursuance of public policy objectives to the benefit of 
citizens and corporate persons (see Article x1(1)(a)(b)), contrasting with previous versions of the Commission 
(compare with Article 1(a) of the Textual proposal on regulatory cooperation of April 2015, supra note 19). 
38 On the composite legal framework that could partially avert this effect, see Section 5 below. 
39 On the constitutional limits of regulatory cooperation from a EU perspective, see Anne Meuwese, Constitutional 
Aspects of Regulatory Coherence in TTIP: An EU Perspective, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (2015). 
40 See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Annex. 
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outcomes of regulatory cooperation.41 Formally, this would raise little normative concerns. Their acts 
would be subject to judicial review according to the rules of the domestic legal systems.42 Nevertheless, 
apart from possible standing restrictions, the question is how far reviewing courts may go in scrutinizing 
decisions of domestic institutions and bodies, the substance of which is defined via international 
regulatory exchanges that may not be formalized. Answers will in part depend on how the institutional 
framework will be set up. At any rate, the suggestion that judicial review could be disruptive of regulatory 
cooperation (because formal litigation could engender the resistance of regulators, subvert the dialogue 
between regulators that fosters “trust and learning” and, hence, compromise the basis of regulatory 
cooperation) could not possibly lead, on constitutional grounds, to restrictions in judicial review.43 In a 
scenario in which there would be obstacles to effective judicial review, and depending on how political 
accountability will be designed, functional needs of cooperation could lead to a virtually closed system of 
decision-making.  
3.2. Inclusiveness, equality and public scrutiny 
Irrespective of whether the conditions could be there to give rise to a “deliberative 
supranationalism” of sorts that would be effective in transcending protectionist interests while engaging 
participants in a transatlantic deliberative process, the putative democratic connotations of such process 
would not obviate problems of inclusiveness, equality and public scrutiny.44 Socialization within such 
working groups may impact on the range of competing interests considered in the dialogue, potentially 
trumping public interests that, by legal determination, ought to be duly regarded and protected. Interests 
voiced in consultation procedures may be dismissed as irrelevant if they do not align with the prevailing 
views of the regulators involved (notwithstanding commitments to take all input into account). The 
assumption often made that regulatory equivalence that may be reached via cooperation is just a matter of 
checking technical differences in regulation – an assumption which regulators involved are likely to share 
– may in itself ignore the possibility of distributional effects stemming from decisions of equivalence and 
strengthen situations of “structural disregard”.45  
                                                 
41 See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x5(1) states that they will “conduct” 
“cooperation activities” leading to regulatory compatibility and the proposal indicates at other points the intention to 
keep decision-making with the domestic regulatory authorities (see in particular p. 10). 
42 Dispute settlement is explicitly excluded (See, EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, 
Article x9 and EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices, Article 11), as it has also been 
excluded from matters arising under the TPP’s chapter on regulatory coherence (TPP, supra note 18, Article 25.11). 
43 On that argument, see Hoekman, Supply Chain World, supra note 3, at 15. 
44 On deliberative supranationalism, see Christian Joerges & Jürgen Neyer, From intergovernmental bargaining to deliberative 
political processes: the constitutionalisation of comitology, 3 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 273 (1999). For a critique touching on 
some of these issues, see Josseph Weiler, Comitology’ as a Revolution – Infranationalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy, in 
EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS (C. Joerges and E. Vos, eds., 1999)at 348-9. 
45 Stewart, Remedying Disregard, supra note 4, at 213 & 223 (indicating that structural disregard may be justified 
insofar as specialized agencies are not required to consider all interests possibly concerned by their decisions.) 
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The “good regulatory practices” that are part of the model of regulatory cooperation proposed by 
the successive textual proposals of the Commission could obviate the possible closure of the system that 
would result from the institutional embeddedness of regulatory cooperation. They may not suffice to 
ensure inclusiveness and equality of access and treatment, but they could ensure transparency and 
openness to public input.46 In the Commission’s textual proposal, each party would have the duty to make 
a list of planned acts publicly available and provide related information.47 They would need to “offer a 
reasonable opportunity for any natural or legal person on a non-discriminatory basis to provide input”, allow 
opportunities for interested parties to assess how they may be affected, and “consider the contributions 
received”.48 In addition, the parties would “affirm [their] intention” to carry out impact assessments, 
whose findings would be made public available (as would be the results of retrospective evaluations).49  
These procedural duties and commitment (in the case of impact assessments) apply domestically. 
They apply to any regulatory act adopted at the central level (i.e. EU legislative proposals and non-legislative 
acts covered by Articles 290 and 291 TFEU; US draft bills and agencies rules as defined in Article 2 of the 
Commission’s proposal) “in respect to any matter covered by [TTIP]”. They would apply irrespective of 
actual instances of regulatory cooperation stricto sensu, i.e. of irrespective of regulatory cooperation 
activities or initiatives.50 Building on practices that are, at a general level, common to the EU and the US, 
they are the basis to establishing trust among regulators, insofar as they graft common duties in their 
domestic decision-making and possibly lead them to adopt common methodologies to assess impacts and 
to collect data.51 The Commission’s proposal provides a basis for mutual adjustment of existing practices. 
In the case of the EU, upon signature and ratification of TTIP, they would make binding institutional 
practices that the Commission has thus far refused to formalize via a legislative act. In this case, an 
international trade agreement would enshrine in formal law the way the Commission has shaped 
rulemaking procedures, instead of a legislative act which, in view of the constitutional provisions of the 
Treaty on democracy, arguably should shape rulemaking in a way that would align institutional practices 
with minimum normative requirements of democratic procedures.52  
                                                 
46 See further infra Section 4. 
47 EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices, Article 5. 
48 EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices, Article 6, emphasis added. 
49 The terms in which impact assessments would be carried out are specified in Article 8. On retrospective 
evaluations, see Article 9. 
50 Regulatory cooperation stricto sensu includes the regulatory cooperation activities envisaged in the Commission’s 
Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, in particular in Articles x4 and x5 (e.g. mutual recognition).  
51 As the Commission puts it “adhering to [good regulatory practices] can help create a better understanding and 
trust in trading partners’ respective regulatory systems” (An Introduction to the EU’s revised proposal, supra note 25, 
p. 2). 
52 It should be noted that the European Parliament has excluded rulemaking from a possible law on the EU 
administrative procedure, mostly on legal basis grounds, but also in accordance with the Inter-institutional agreement 
on better law-making. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Administrative Procedure of the European Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, discussed at the 
Hearing of the Committee on Legal Affairs (28 January 2016,), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/juri/events.html;jsessionid=D97214D54ADC0B228E1A40245611
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The rules on transparency and participation that apply to decision-making in the international fora 
of regulatory cooperation (working groups and, possibly, regulatory cooperation body) are defined 
elsewhere, in the textual proposal on regulatory cooperation.53 The indication that regulatory cooperation 
activities will be carried out transparently and will be open to public input is a novelty of the text made 
public in March 2016. The earlier proposals on regulatory cooperation did not specify procedural duties at 
this level of decision-making.54 How effective the procedural rules applied domestically and internationally 
may be in opening regulatory cooperation to scrutiny and public input will depend on how they will be 
implemented and enforced, and also on the intricate vertical and circular relations between domestic and 
global regulatory decision-making.55 The Commission’s textual proposal on regulatory cooperation is, at 
the time of the writing, silent on the articulation between decisions possibly adopted by working groups 
and high-level political bodies established by TTIP (even if only of advisory nature, as indicated in the 
section on the institutional structure), on the one hand, and the decisions adopted by regulatory 
authorities domestically in implementation of regulatory cooperation, on the other.56 
Despite the openness that participation seems to bring into procedures of regulatory cooperation, 
as now envisaged, a normative assessment of the qualities of participation in regulatory cooperation 
requires further reflection. As will be argued below, the role of participation is ambiguous and it would be 
unwise to assume too promptly that the system delineated in the Commission’s proposals ensures due 
consideration of divergent voices.  
4. Participation: entrenching power or constraining authority? 
4.1. A functional-instrumental perspective on participation 
Participation is a core feature of the model of regulatory cooperation because it is a governance 
tool at the service of the functional needs of regulatory cooperation. The involvement of the so-called 
                                                                                                                                                        
8936.node2?id=20160128CHE00181); see also point 30 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European 
Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123/1, 
12.5.2016), albeit restricted to implementing acts). On the possible influence of TTIP on the way non-legislative 
procedures have been regulated in the better regulation agenda, see infra note 56 below. On the different meanings 
of participation, see section 4 below. 
53 See Section 4 below, in particular Sub-sections 4.1. and 4.2. 
54 Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x6. On the possibilities of participation that 
would give access at this level and their assessment, see infra Section 4.2. 
55 See Richard Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to US Administrative Law, 37 NYU J. OF INT’L L & POL. 
695(2005); Joana Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes: hollowing out procedural standards?, 10 INT’L J. OF CON. L. 
988 (2012) (for the EU). 
56 What is nevertheless clear is the ability of those provisions to change the domestic procedural rules. A binding 
duty of consultation has been for a long time absent in the EU legal system, not least due to the resistances of the 
Commission. This absence was mostly felt at the level of non-legislative rulemaking procedures, where impact 
assessments (and the ancillary consultation) were rare. Impact assessments (and consultations) in those cases have 
been now explicitly included in the scope of impact assessment procedures since May 2015, arguably as a way to 
accommodate EU internal procedures to the possible future requirements of TTIP. This change has been sanctioned 
in the Inter-institutional agreement on better law-making (point 13).  
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stakeholders is essential to the success of regulatory cooperation: it is a means of strengthening the 
evidence basis of the outcomes of cooperation and of ensuring their validation. In technically complex, 
uncertain and fast-changing environments, regulators may lack the necessary resources to identify the 
instances where regulatory divergences entail unjustified obstacles to trade and to satisfactorily address the 
problems that emerge from domestically defined regulatory requirements. Participation of “stakeholders” 
in decision-making is particularly relevant in a scenario in which regulation would move away from the 
sector specific basis that has prevailed hitherto and would adopt the perspective of the global trade chains. 
By contrast to market operators, regulators often lack this perspective.57 Participation generates 
information on how the cumulative effect of different regulations may impact on international trade and 
investment and generate gaps. It fosters a collaborative process of data and evidence collection, which has 
a three-fold function: it creates trust and mutual understanding between regulators from different 
jurisdictions; it provides a basis for the external justification of their decisions; it allows the fine-tuning of 
regulatory responses to uncertain and fast-changing realities in an experimentalist fashion. For these 
reasons, the involvement of the regulated industries is considered crucial to the success of the regulatory 
cooperation efforts, to the point that it may evolve into a “public-private partnership” model of decision-
making.58  
The successive Commission’s textual proposals on regulatory cooperation reflect this functional 
perspective on participation. Consultation is one of the “good regulatory practices” that the parties should 
follow domestically, when preparing their regulatory acts. Its main function is arguably to facilitate mutual 
trust in the parties’ respective decision-making systems, and to open their procedures to input from the 
companies, associations and citizens of either party and of third parties. That participation will be “non-
discriminatory” is important for this reason, apart from the normative connotation of equal access.59 
Consultation as an instrument of better regulation is the prevailing approach to participation in 
rulemaking in the EU. Participation in TTIP, as proposed in the text of the Commission, has been largely 
conceived as a continuation of the Commission’s practices. Arguably, the main concern underlying such 
procedures is to “target the evidence needed to make sound decisions”.60 From this perspective, 
participation is mainly valued in its ability to enhance problem-solving capacities, process efficiency and 
policy outcomes. Even if it may also contribute to opening decision-making procedures to the input of 
                                                 
57 Hoekman, Supply Chain World, supra note 3, at 5-6. Referring to CETA, he considers that “(e)ngagement with 
stakeholders is arguably critical and should be given stronger institutional foundations” (criticizing the “may” in the 
provision on consultation of stakeholders, ibid., at 9). 
58 Hoekman, Supply Chain World, supra note 3, at 12-13. Hoekman suggests the establishment of knowledge 
platforms, as a better alternative to public consultations (ibid., at 10). 
59 On the instrumental reasons of “good regulatory practices”, including participation, see Commission, An 
Introduction to the EU’s revised proposal, supra note 25, p. 2. The emphasis on non-discrimination between “any” 
interested natural or legal person would seem to enable also the participation of third parties (Article 6 of the 
Commission’s Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices). 
60 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Better regulation for better results – An EU Agenda”, 
COM(2015) 215 final, Strasbourg, 19.5.2015, point 2.1.  
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interested parties, it is a means to ask “the right people… the right questions about the right initiatives, so 
as to feed into Commission decision-making in an efficient manner”.61 Participation is also a means to 
assess the willingness of interested persons to comply with the regulatory proposals on which they give 
input – in the words of the Commission, to “ensure broadest public validation and support for an initiative”.62 
Moreover, they also enable the Commission to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Parliament and the 
Member States.63  
Another opportunity of participation that TTIP would introduce at the domestic level is worth 
mentioning. Interested persons would be able to suggest improvements to existing regulatory frameworks 
(e.g. on their ability to achieve the purported public policy objectives) or possibilities of “simplification or 
burden reduction”.64 The parties would be legally bound to provide such opportunities, seemingly outside 
specific consultation procedures. Arguably, this duty emphasizes the collaborative model of decision-
making that the provisions on regulatory cooperation in TTIP convey  
The access points that the parties would need to provide are not limited to domestic regulation, 
the Commission having proposed input opportunities also in the transatlantic phase of regulatory 
cooperation. Participation as collaboration by interested parties is also visible here (though other forms of 
input transcend a purely functional-instrumental rationale, as will be seen in more detail below).65 Thus, 
the possibility that natural or legal persons would submit initiatives for regulatory co-operation, including 
proposals for regulatory compatibility, to the parties would be mainly geared towards optimizing decision-
making in the sense indicated above, thereby “[improving] the regulatory environment”.66 Upon 
assessment by both parties, the initiative may be incorporated in the Annual Regulatory Co-operation 
Program. No further details or requirements on procedural guarantees of equality of access and treatment 
are specified in this respect, leaving significant leeway (at present) to the parties on how to regulate this 
possibility. Only a footnote indicates a commitment to avoid privileged treatment.67 The section below 
will consider in more detail how participation conceived as a means of collaboration differs from 
participation as a means to voice and ensure the procedural protection of legally protected interests that 
                                                 
61 Commission Staff Working Document, Review of the Commission Consultation Policy, SWD(2012) 422 final, Strasbourg, 
12 October 2012, at 10. 
62 Better Regulation 2015, p. 76, emphasis added. 
63 Beate Kohler Koch, Civil Society and Democracy in the EU. High Expectations under Empirical Scrutiny, DE-
MYSTIFICATION OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: EU GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY (B. Kohler Koch & C. 
Quittkat, eds, 2013), at 11. 
64 Commission’s Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices, Article 7. 
65 The three access points are foreseen in the Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Articles 
x5(2); x6(1) and (2); and Article x6(3). The last two will be analyzed in the section below. 
66 Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x5(2). The quotation is from EU Commission, 
Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP. An Introduction to the EU’s revised proposal, 21 March 2016, p. 5. By contrast to 
the previous proposals, which also foresaw this possibility, the new text provides that it is the parties, and not the 
Regulatory Cooperation Body, that receive and assess these proposals, thus curtailing powers of initiative that such 
body could otherwise have (even if only in an informal way).  
67 Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, p. 6, note 10. 
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may conflict with the possible preferences of regulators and of the more powerful groups on whose 
collaboration they may rely. 
4.2. Collaboration and contestation 
Participation procedures created to optimize decision-making in the sense indicated above may be open 
and inclusive of interests different from those of the regulated industries. If participation is open to the 
public, without further specification, they also formally ensure conditions of equal access.. They may be a 
means of broadening the expertise available to decision-makers also beyond the circle of the regulated 
industries. Taking as a reference point the institutional practice in the EU, the 2015 better regulation 
guidelines indicate that officials should “[seek] the whole spectrum of views in order to avoid bias or 
skewed conclusions (‘capture’) promoted by specific constituencies”; they specify that “target groups that 
run the risk of being excluded” should be identified, “balance and comprehensive coverage” should be 
sought, and “privileged access for some stakeholders should be avoided”.68 Empirical research on the 
consultation practices of the Commission has confirmed that they have indeed opened decision-making. 
They have taken the collaborative links between EU institutions and interested parties “out of the 
shadows of opaque lobbying”, facilitating composition of competing interests at an early stage, despite the 
remaining imbalances in representation.69 They entail an element of constraint, since the public 
commitment to inclusion and openness has a self-binding effect.70 Public consultations have widened the 
spectrum of interests voiced, by enabling weaker groups to participate, even if they have also further 
empowered the more influential groups.71 
Yet, there are no inbuilt mechanisms that would ensure the due consideration of views that would 
oppose the prevailing preferences of decision-makers or of the views of those that, for different reasons, 
are not considered relevant to governance purposes. Equal treatment of the voices heard, in view of the 
legally protected interests, has hitherto not been ensured by the Commission’s practices. Reason-giving or 
feedback reports on the results of consultations could play a role in this respect. However, important 
deficiencies in the Commission’s reports and handling of consultation results are disadvantageous to 
minority views and strengthen the voice of the most powerful groups.72 The rationale for participation is 
one of collaboration in the achievement of better knowledge-based outcomes, for which inclusiveness 
may also be important. The rationale of participation is not to create a basis for decision-making that 
                                                 
68 Better Regulation 2015, p. 73-76. 
69 Beate Kohler Koch, Civil Society Participation. More Democracy or Pluralisation of the European lobby?, in DE-
MYSTIFICATION OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: EU GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY (B. Kohler Koch & C. 
Quittkat, eds, 2013), at 184. 
70 Ibid., at 185. 
71 Ibid., at 176-82. 
72 Ibid., at 180. Kohler Koch points out that “the summaries of the positions are for the most part generalized, 
minority opinions are lumped together, the focus is placed on the statements by political influential actors, and the 
conclusions by the Commission are vague. (…) the reports do not offer sufficient grounds to force the Commission 
to justify its decisions”. 
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ensures in equal terms the due consideration for the legally protected interests and rights potentially 
affected, the plurality of views heard and contestation to possibly preferred options. Participation is a tool 
for evidence-based policy-making, and thereby directed at those who may strengthen the evidence basis of 
the outcomes of regulatory cooperation, as indicated by the mentioned deficiencies in the Commission’s 
practices and by the Commission’s understanding of consultation as a means to ask “the right people… 
the right questions”.73 These features of the Commission’s practices significantly hinder the ability of 
participation to serve as a means to address the “problem of disregard”.74 Article 6 of the Commission’s 
proposal on good regulatory practices, applicable to consultations on domestic regulatory acts, could be an 
avenue to participation as a means to give voice in equal terms to legally protected interests and to enable 
the active engagement of interested persons in public decision-making. However, to this effect, it would 
need to be accompanied by procedural rules and mechanisms of control that would concretize 
participation in this way and would counter the existing deficiencies of institutional practices. In this 
model, contestation may be a side effect of opportunities for participation in decision-making in the 
framework of regulatory cooperation, because of the publicity of consultations.75 The mobilization of 
groups adverse to TTIP during the period of negotiations is indicative of the possibilities of contestation 
via internet campaigns, media attention and political influence. They might eventually induce change, but 
do so through mechanisms that are external to established structures of decision-making. Consultations, 
as currently practiced, would not necessarily bring that contestation into decision-making procedures. 
As mentioned above, Article 6 of the Commission’s proposal on good regulatory practices would 
make this model legally binding in the EU. It does not change domestic procedural laws and practices: in 
giving effect to their duty to consult when preparing regulatory acts, the parties will rely on their 
“respective rules and procedures”. It is not excluded that this duty of consultation would ground an 
improvement of the deficiencies pointed out above (depending also on how compliance with this 
procedural duty would be enforced). Yet, at least in what concerns giving reasons on the results of the 
consultation process, the text as it stands accommodates the perpetuation of the weaknesses of the 
Commission’s consultation practices: the parties “shall endeavor” to make explanations publicly available, 
they are not legally obliged to achieve this result.76 
The main novelty would be public consultations on the bilateral regulatory cooperation activities 
strictu senso, taking place in the transatlantic phase of regulatory cooperation (i.e. not during domestic 
regulatory procedures upon which these activities impact and on which they rely). The text of the 
respective provision is drafted in terms that indicate normative concerns different from a purely 
                                                 
73 See, supra note 61. These reasons hinder a functional equivalence between institutional practices that convey an 
instrumental meaning of participation and legal rules that could concretize a political-legal meaning of participation, 
contrary to the view of the General Court of the EU in Judgment of 12 June 2015,The Health Food Manufacturers' 
Association, Case T-296/12, EU:T:2015:375, para 181. 
74 Stewart, Remedying Disregard, supra note 4, at 220. 
75 Consider also the problems of vertical articulation (supra, Section 3.2). 
76 Commission’s Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices, Article 6(4). 
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instrumental rationale.77 Under the heading “transparency and public participation”, the Commission 
proposes that any interested person would be heard on the progress of existing regulatory cooperation, 
would be able to submit new initiatives and views on priority setting. These submissions would be made 
public (subject to the protection of confidentiality and personal data) and “timely information” would be 
provided on their assessment.78 This provision could be an avenue to participation as a means to give 
voice in equal terms to legally protected interests and to enable the active engagement of interested 
persons in public decision-making.79 If equality of access and treatment would be ensured, it would open 
decision-making to the input of a plurality of interests, which would be balanced with sufficient guarantees 
of transparency. However, to this effect, the proposed provision needs to be accompanied by procedural 
rules and mechanisms of control that, suitable for those purposes, would avoid reproducing at the 
transatlantic level the deficiencies of domestic institutional practices. Mechanisms of oversight and 
enforcement will be critical.  
Whether these consultations will foster contestation and whether, overall, contestation will stay at 
the margins of the decision-making system delineated in the Commission’s textual proposals remains to be 
seen. The consultations of Article x6 of the proposal on regulatory cooperation would be one opportunity 
of participation that co-exists with other possibilities of access to interested parties informed by a different 
rationale. These may contribute to the entrenchment of the collaborative links between regulators and 
interested persons, and thereby to the entrenchment of the power of regulators in relation to other 
domestic institutions (to the extent that evidenced-based participation adds strength to their decisions). 
This possible effect is exacerbated if the possibilities of parliamentary oversight are weak and if outcomes 
of regulatory cooperation are removed from judicial challenge.80  
4.3. Constraining authority in a new regulatory paradigm  
Participation may have a decisive role in shifting the regulatory paradigm from sector-specific to one 
focused on the global trade chains. In this paradigm, regulatory responses would be adjusted to the socio-
economic reality of globalization and regulatory segmentation would be overcome, thus facilitating the 
circulation of goods and services and avoiding coordination gaps that entail risks to the protection of 
public goods. Participation would be central to this transition, given the functional advantages indicated 
                                                 
77 Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation. Article x.6.  
78 Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x6(1) and (2). 
79 The Commission complements this provision with a commitment to ensure equality and to reach out to weaker 
groups reinforces the inference that participation (footnote 13). A concern for balanced representation and inclusion 
of holders of various affected interests is also present in the proposal to create domestic advisory groups that each 
party would consult on the Joint Annual Regulatory Co-operation Program (EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on 
Regulatory Cooperation, Article x6(3)). 
80 See, further, Eyal Benvenisti, Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public a Law, 
IILJ Working Paper 2016/2 (MegaReg Series), at 6-13. 
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above.81 This possible long-term perspective calls for a critical consideration of the purpose and design of 
participation mechanisms in the framework of regulatory cooperation, in particular because this transition 
may remove decision-making further away from domestic constitutional constraints. Regulatory 
collaboration endorses a legal (not only factual) disconnect between decision-making based on domestic 
mandates, on the one hand, and procedures that are designed to overcome the limits of those mandates, 
on the other. 
It may very well be that without the involvement of the regulated industries any effort of 
regulatory cooperation is doomed to fail for the instrumental reasons mentioned above. Yet, accepting 
this premise requires considering the challenges that a public-private means of transatlantic regulation 
poses to the equal treatment of affected interests, in particular to the protection of those interests that may 
be excluded from the schemes of collaboration that underpin transatlantic regulation. The distributional 
effects of the outcomes of regulatory cooperation, potentially impacting on the way rights and interests 
are legally protected, as well as normative concerns for equality and dignity, shed light on the 
insufficiencies of a regulatory model anchored on inter-regulatory and, by and large, on public-private 
collaboration. In the case of the European Union, these shortcomings are evidenced by the Treaty 
determination that its external action ought to be grounded in and respect its founding principles, 
including democracy, rule of law, human dignity, fundamental rights and equality.82 Apart from 
normatively unsatisfactory, such a model may arguably prove empirically unsuited, insofar as public 
resistances to regulatory outcomes defined in more or less exclusive negotiating fora may build sufficient 
pressure to prevent regulators from endorsing solutions with verified benefits.        
If regulatory cooperation is going to be carried out on the basis of continuous data exchanges and 
dialogue between regulators and natural and legal persons, in a way that blurs the boundaries between 
decision-making, implementation and enforcement,83 it will amount to an exercise of authority via 
collaboration. Collaboration may evolve from opportunities of participation that are restricted to selected 
interested parties, e.g. when input into decision-making occurs via consultation of advisory groups or 
“knowledge platforms”.84 It may de facto arise from procedures that are open to the public, when the 
range of participants is not representative of the potentially affected interests and when structural 
deficiencies strengthen the position of the stronger and politically more influential groups.85 Authority 
expresses itself in the ability to change the relative position of holders of rights, legally protected interests 
and duties when they establish legal relationships. In this case, authority is exercised via an act that 
                                                 
81 See supra Sub-section 4.1. 
82 Article 21(1), (2)(b) TEU. See, further, Petersmann, supra note 6, at 586-89. 
83 Along the lines of negotiated relationships advocated by Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 
NYU L. REV. 543 (2000), at 571-3.  
84 Hoekman, Supply Chain World, supra note 3, at 9-15. 
85 Collaboration may evolve from situations of “procedural disregard” (Stewart, Remedying Disregard, supra note 4, 
at 224). Reporting such instances in the EU’s consultation practices, see Koch Kohler, supra note 71, at 180. In this 
case, it is more difficult to delimit the borders between what remains (non-decisional) participation and what 
becomes a form of public-private collaboration. 
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emerges from a collaborative scheme involving public and private actors.86 It changes unilaterally the legal 
positions of those excluded from the collaborative scheme. This effect requires political-legal mechanisms 
that incorporate incentives in decision-making to ensure regard for the distributional effects of the 
outcomes of regulatory cooperation, specifically to the position of those affected interests that are not 
represented in the collaborative arrangements.  
Participation could be one of such mechanisms. However, to this effect, it should be given a 
political-legal meaning that transcends the functional-instrumental rationale. The grounds for participation 
should be the ability of the outcomes of regulatory cooperation to impact on one’s rights and legally 
protected interests, and the normative need to give voice to those affected in equal terms, in a process 
where competing public interests will be considered and weighed. Participation should be valued as an 
exercise of political freedom - an active engagement in the way one is governed87 - or of individual 
freedom (even if mediated by representative organizations) to voice one’s rights and legally protected 
interests.88 While there is a minimum threshold of knowledge that participants need to reach in order to 
be able to meaningfully influence decision-making,89 from this political-legal perspective the reference to 
delimit relevant participation would be the affected person, not the expert. The qualities of “affected 
person” and “expert” may overlap in some cases, but they do not in all cases. Participation would be 
conceived as an instrument to ensure consideration of the range of competing legally protected interests 
that may be affected by the outcomes of regulatory cooperation, the plurality of the views heard and 
contestation to the possibly preferred options. 
Insofar as participants give voice to interests that the domestic legal systems protect, participation 
would become more than a means to “target the evidence needed to make sound decisions”. 90 It would 
be valued in its ability to bring into decision-making a representation of the possible distributional effects 
of the decisions on regulatory equivalence (one of the possible outcomes of regulatory cooperation). The 
range of relevant voices to take into consideration would not be chosen in accordance with the 
preferences of the regulators involved, in view of the knowledge resources that they may lack, “so as to 
feed into … decision-making in an efficient manner”. 91 It would be defined by reference to legal interests 
that, being possibly affected by the outcomes of regulatory initiatives taken by regulators to implement an 
                                                 
86 Public and private actors act in an interdependent way. The verification of exercise of authority does not depend 
on the ability to determine when private participation in governance may be considered state action (on three tests 
used to this effect by the US Supreme Court for purposes of constitutional due process and their critique, see 
Freeman, supra note 74, at 576-81). Defining authority by its impact on collective and individual freedom see Armin 
von Bogandy et al., From Public International to International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International 
Public Authority, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No. 
2016-02 (2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2770639, at 22. 
87 Jeremey Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure” in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW (J. Fleming, ed., 
2011), at 20. 
88 Joana Mendes, Participation and the role of law after Lisbon: a legal view on Article 11 TEU, 48 COMMON MARKET LAW 
REVIEW 1849 (2011), at 1864-65. 
89 On the structural difficulties of weaker groups, see Stewart, Remedying Disregard, supra note 4, at 263. 
90 Communication from the Commmission, supra note 55. 
91 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 56, at 10. 
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international agreement, are protected by their respective legal systems. One criterion to assess the 
pertinence of the input given by participants would be the extent to which they contribute to a better 
representation and composition of those interests. In this political-legal understanding, participation may 
create the conditions to avoid biases in decision-making generated by the lack of consideration or 
disproportionate weighing of competing interests, which deny the material justice of regulatory outcomes 
expressed in the due consideration of legally protected interests.92 Participation also postulates a 
justification of the regulatory outcomes that explains the reasons why some legally protected interests were 
given preference to the detriment of others, in view of the standards of protection endorsed in each legal 
system – justification directed at the affected publics, rather than at the groups that may have been more 
influential or at a network of peers.  
This perspective on participation would arguably diminish the scope for dismissing as unusable 
input given by participants if it is not framed in a way that deviates from accepted language and prevailing 
discourses.93 It will not correct the persisting power imbalances between different participants, but may 
compel the consideration of weaker interests in different terms. Their holders voice legally protected 
interests that need to be weighed in decision-making by force of legal rules – an aspect that a focus on the 
functional-instrumental dimension of participation and a predominant concern on evidence-based 
decision-making may easily overlook.94 However, this shift arguably requires, first, that participation 
procedures are designed in a way that frames the choices of regulators on who are the relevant participants 
and what are the grounds to value their input, and, second, that there are external mechanisms to ensure 
respect for inclusiveness, equality, and public scrutiny.95 The provision on “transparency and public 
participation” of the Commission’s textual proposal on regulatory cooperation could be a basis to develop 
such procedures and mechanisms.  
Requirements of inclusiveness and justification ought to constrain the authority of regulators 
deciding on the equivalence of technical standards insofar as they compel them to form a comprehensive 
view on the possible effects of their decisions on legally protected interests. Such a comprehensive view is 
all the more important when the underlying purpose of regulatory cooperation is to confront 
representatives of regulators and competent authorities with the adverse effects on trade of their silo-
vision of regulatory requirements, and, thereby, to overcome the disconnect between regulation and the 
reality of global trade chains. If regulators are invited to move outside the limits of their legal mandates, to 
be able to fully appreciate the possibility that their rules cause unjustified barriers to trade and, in this light, 
                                                 
92 Joana Mendes, Rule of law and participation: A normative analysis of internationalized rulemaking as composite procedures, 12 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370 (2014), at 379-80; 385-87. 
93 See Benjamin Farrand, Trading Information for Influence: Forms of Knowledge and the Power of Legitimacy, in KNOWLEDGE, 
POWER AND THE LAW BEYOND THE STATE (M. Bartl and E. Tauschinsky, eds.), Amsterdam Law School Research 
Paper No. 2016-08, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2728148, at 11. 
94 Arguing that, despite powers imbalances, weaker groups benefit from opportunities of participation, see Stewart, 
Remedying Disregard, supra note 4, at 262; see also Joana Mendes, PARTICIPATION IN EU RULEMAKING. A RIGHTS-
BASED APPROACH (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 234-6. 
95 Mendes, Participation and the Role of Law after Lisbon”, supra note 88. 
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assess regulatory equivalence, they also ought to consider – in that same situation – which distributional 
effects judgments of equivalence may have and what their impacts on legally protected interests may be.  
There are limits to how far decision-makers may be required to go in order to consider the 
interests of those affected by their decisions. In legal terms, these efforts may be confined to the limits of 
their mandates, specifically to the interests that decision-makers are bound to protect and pursue.96 Yet, in 
the context of regulatory cooperation in mega-regional agreements, they meet their peers to overcome the 
duplication and gaps that arise from the sector-segmented model of regulation that prevails in domestic 
settings. Regulatory outcomes will prospectively be the result of aggregate views of regulators with a view 
both to agreeing on terms of equivalence that reduce barriers to trade and to identifying gaps that may 
lead to public health, environment, consumer, or labor risks. In this scenario, the argument that decision-
makers should be required to take into account only the interests that they are bound to pursue in view of 
their mandates loses strength. By force of an international agreement, they become participants in 
collaborative schemes that purposively extend beyond the limits of their mandate-based regulatory action.  
5. Inclusiveness: which legal yardsticks in a composite framework? 
The claim that regulators engaging in regulatory cooperation should be legally required to pay 
heed to the distributional effects of the outcomes of their cooperation efforts raises difficult questions. 
Where should inclusiveness be a normative requirement in regulatory cooperation processes that cut 
across various levels of decision-making? How far are regulators required to go in order to ensure 
inclusive decision-making, in particular if one holds that their domestic mandates are limited frames of 
reference when they engage in regulatory cooperation? What are the yardsticks for inclusiveness and 
justification? These questions require academic elaboration, which would flesh out participation as a 
procedural requirement that may constrain or structure the authority of regulators involved in 
collaboration. They will not be answered here. Yet, some indications may be given on the basic reference 
points that one should consider when sketching participation in the political-legal sense defended above. 
 The international agreements that set up the structures and procedures of regulatory cooperation 
provide the general legal framework that delimits the scope of action of regulators “giving life” to the 
agreements. While highly complex, these agreements define a basic frame of reference to delimit the 
public interests that regulators ought to be pursuing and balancing when considering what may constitute 
unjustified technical barriers to trade. Hence, they delimit the legally protected interests that participants 
would be called to voice in the fora where regulatory cooperation is decided, at the level of working 
groups or at the level of horizontal coordination between these groups.97 Participation in the political-legal 
sense defended here would be one of the mechanisms designed to ensure that those interests are duly 
considered and weighed in decision-making. If this were the model to be followed, the text of the 
                                                 
96 Stewart, Remedying Disregard, supra note 4, at 225-8. 
97 On TTIP, see, e.g., EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article x1. 
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agreement should include norms that would make this function of participation clear, in the line of the 
provision on consultations now included in the Commission’s textual proposal on regulatory cooperation. 
This provision is drafted in terms that could satisfy requirements of inclusiveness, equality, justification 
and publicity, the fulfillment of which will largely depend on ancillary procedural rules and mechanisms of 
enforcement. The way the domestic and transatlantic phases of regulatory cooperation will interact will 
also be determinant to channel participation in a way that final outcomes may result from a fair balancing 
of the legally protected interests they may affect.98  
The shaping of mechanisms and legal rules that structure the authority of the regulators 
implementing the agreement is in the hands of the political institutions involved in the drafting and 
signing of these agreements, as well as, more remotely, of the parliaments that ratify them. Negotiators 
will define the scope of public interests that regulators ought to pursue and the norms that will provide 
criteria for balancing those interests, thereby delimiting the scope of the relevant interests that should be 
voiced in decision-making procedures. The diplomatic setting of negotiations is prone to interest group 
influence, which parliamentary ratification is likely unable to correct.99 Nevertheless, as noted above, the 
EU negotiators are bound by the principles of democracy, rule of law, human dignity, and fundamental 
rights, among others. These principles provide normative anchors to build an institutional model of 
decision-making that, even if anchored on the authority of regulators, ought to incorporate countervailing 
mechanisms that go beyond the functional needs of regulatory cooperation. Insofar as these principles are 
not exclusive of the EU legal order, parliaments should act as watchdogs of compliance therewith, since 
ratification will provide the political and legal clout to an agreement against which the actions of regulators 
should also be assessed.100  
At the same time, the provisions of the international agreement function as a binding element of a 
network structure anchored in the domestic legal orders, which delimit the authority of each regulator. The 
agreement both defines the common function of regulators and builds upon their domestic roles and 
mandates. This interwoven structure means that, as members of fora of regulatory cooperation set up by 
the international agreement, regulators should also be bound by the procedural and substantive rules that 
delimit and guide their behavior internally. Their internal regulatory functions are the reason why they are 
                                                 
98 See further the references in note 55. 
99 Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.167 (1999), at 184-7. 
100 Raising constitutional and institutional concerns regarding regulatory cooperation, see European Parliament 
Resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the European Commission on 
the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), point 2 (c)(i) (v). See also the 
following opinions of the Parliament’s Committees attached to in the Motion for Resolution of 1 June 2015: 
Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs, 4.5.2015, point 1(j) (p. 75); Opinion of the Committee on Constitutional 
Affairs, 16.4.2015, point 1(d)(ii), Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs, 4.5.2015, point 1(l) (p. 75); Opinion of 
the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, 16.4.2015, point 5 (available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2015-0175&language=EN). 
Emphasizing the importance of transparency and participation during the negotiations, see Benvenisti, Democracy 
Captured, supra note 80 at 18-20. 
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meeting internationally. Their external action is a continuation of those internal functions.101 In the case of 
TTIP, the binding effect of national legal orders is recognized in the Commission’s textual proposal on 
regulatory cooperation, according to which the provisions on regulatory cooperation do not affect the 
parties’ ability “to adopt, maintain and apply measures without delay (…) to achieve its public policy 
objectives (…) at the level of protection that it considers appropriate, in accordance with its regulatory 
framework and principles”.102  
The simplicity of this construction is of course deceiving: the problem lies precisely in knowing 
how the articulation between the domestic legal orders and the obligations stemming from the 
international agreement may be ensured and how the respective legal orders are coordinated in a way that 
the international obligations stemming from the agreement do not imperil the domestic standards of 
protection of public goods. Nevertheless, this network structure arguably engenders procedural duties of 
domestic actors when acting in an external role. Insofar as international regulatory cooperation leads to 
deviations from internal rules, these ought to be justified internally.103 Deviations from domestic regulatory 
requirements are the very purpose of regulatory cooperation and may therefore be likely. If subject to 
justification, the way in which regulators strove to reconcile the competing public interests, benefiting 
some to the detriment of others, will be open to scrutiny and contestation. The possibility of deviations 
should be fully acknowledged as a legal consequence of an international agreement requiring regulatory 
cooperation. Justification would function as one of the elements linking the different legal orders upon 
which regulatory cooperation relies and upon which it impacts. Understood in this way, it would both 
acknowledge that by virtue of their international obligations under mega-regional agreements, regulators 
are required to move beyond the strict scope of their domestic mandates; and recall that these mandates 
ought to still frame and structure their discretion. In this way, justification would be an element of the 
vertical articulation of the legal orders involved, which could avoid “exit ways” that may lead to instances 
of unrestrained authority.104  
Taking seriously the argument that the distributional effects imply a change in the legal spheres of 
persons affected throughout the trade chain has an additional challenge: the consideration of the legal 
spheres of persons in third countries.105 Distributional effects will not stop at the borders of the 
jurisdictions of the parties to mega-regional agreements. The arguments above seem to assume they do. 
They highlight the composite legal framework that grounds and ought to structure the discretion of 
                                                 
101 Mendes, Rule of law and participation, supra note 92, at 396. 
102 EU Commission’s Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation, Article 1(3)(a) (emphasis added). Also the 
regulatory cooperation chapters of TPP and CETA refer, respectively, to the goal of “[facilitating the] achievement 
of domestic policy objectives” (TPP, supra note 19, Article 25.2(1)) and of “[promoting] transparent, efficient and 
effective regulatory processes that support the public policy objectives and fulfill the mandates of the regulatory 
bodies”, presumably their domestic mandates (CETA, supra note 19, Article 21.2(4)(c)). 
103 Mendes, Rule of law and participation, supra note 92, at 396. 
104 See, Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, supra note 92 (albeit referring to treaty making and 
ratification) 
105 Benvenisti, Democracy Captured, supra note 80 at 13-18. 
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regulators engaged in regulatory cooperation. They indicate that the text of the agreement and the Parties’ 
legal orders, which become intertwined by force of the agreement, provide the basic references to delimit 
the scope of relevant participation and justification. However, referring to the positive legal grounds of the 
activity of regulators may not provide a foundation to address the way third countries and holders of 
legally protected interests that are outside the jurisdiction of the parties should be treated, unless the 
composite legal framework in which regulators operate includes norms to this effect. Yet, both factual 
impacts of outcomes of regulatory cooperation and the normative rationales of participation in the 
political-legal sense defended in this paper require that decision-making in the context of regulatory 
cooperation is inclusive also of the legally protected interests of third parties. The ways to concretize this 
claim are far from clear and merit further reflection. 
6. Conclusion 
Regulatory cooperation in mega-regional agreements will rely on institutional and procedural 
structures where decisions defining the legal position of those involved in the trade of goods and services 
and involving the weighing of competing public interests will either be prepared or adopted (depending on 
the various forms that regulatory cooperation may have). Importantly, regulatory cooperation may be a 
step in the transition from a paradigm in which regulation is sector-segmented, as delimited by domestic 
mandates, to one in which regulation would be adjusted to the reality of global trade chains. Both aspects 
call for a critical assessment of the role of participation in a model of collaborative decision-making 
among regulators, in particular given the possibility that participation of the so-called stakeholders may be 
a factor in operating such a transition of regulatory paradigm. 
The successive textual proposals on regulatory cooperation under TTIP put forth by the 
Commission have thus far delineated an institutional model directed at facilitating, as far as possible, 
successful deliberative negotiations among regulators. The possibility that participation could disrupt such 
deliberations, while still having a crucial instrumental value to the success of regulatory cooperation, may 
explain two aspects. First, participation during regulatory cooperation stricto sensu accompanied by 
sufficient guarantees of inclusiveness, formal equal access and publicity – and not only as a procedural 
duty to follow in domestic regulatory procedures – is a newcomer in the Commission’s proposal on 
regulatory cooperation of early 2016. At the transatlantic phase of regulatory cooperation, the earlier 
proposals only mentioned the possibility to submit initiatives for regulatory cooperation to the Regulatory 
Cooperation Body and yearly meetings with “stakeholders” where this same body would discuss the 
Annual Regulatory Co-operation Programme.106 Secondly, it co-exists with access points to decision-
making procedures, both domestically and internationally, geared to ensure the collaboration between 
regulators and private parties. While plausible from a functional-instrumental perspective, these are not 
                                                 
106 Now also revised (see supra notes 66 and 79).  
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designed to provide equal voice to the holders of legally protected interests potentially affected by the 
outcomes of regulatory cooperation, contestation to possibly preferred options, inclusive consideration of 
competing interests, and public scrutiny of the decisions taken.  
As much as the institutional and procedural structures underpinning regulatory collaboration need 
to be fit for purpose, they ought not overlook the normative requirements that, in accordance to the legal 
orders of the parties, need to ground the exercise of authority in democratic systems.107 In the case of 
regulatory collaboration, authority originates in the ability of collaborative schemes of decision-making to 
change unilaterally the legal positions of those excluded from collaboration – to affect both the legal 
spheres of holders of rights, legally protected interests and duties, and the conditions in which public 
goods are protected and provided. 
The common traits that the model of collaborative decision-making among peers underlying 
regulatory cooperation shares with comitology highlighted the normative concerns that the model may 
raise. The contrast with comitology also indicated that, given its legal-institutional embeddeness, 
regulatory cooperation as currently envisaged may lead to a closed system of decision-making, depending 
on two crucial points that remain unclear at the time of the writing: the role of parliaments and of courts 
in relation to decision-making taking place in the context of regulatory cooperation; and the articulation 
between the domestic and the international spheres of decision-making. Participation may counter the 
closure of the system, to some extent, depending on how the current provision on “transparency and 
public participation” is implemented and enforced. Other forms of participation, also envisaged in the 
proposal, may instead largely feed into the schemes of collaboration that underline regulatory cooperation 
and entrench the power of regulators engaging in international collaboration. 
The paper proposed a political-legal perspective on participation that could create some of the 
conditions to constrain and structure the way authority is exercised via regulatory collaboration. 
Inclusiveness would compel regulators to, as far as possible, have a comprehensive view on the 
distributional effects of their assessments on regulatory equivalence in the global trade chains (on which 
they are prompted to focus), and to weigh the competing legally protected interests that may be affected; 
equality of access and treatment of the results of consultation would formally contribute to avoid biases; 
justification of the outcomes of regulatory collaboration that accounts for the way in which given legally 
protected interests may be given preference to the detriment of others (in view of the standards of 
protection valid in the domestic legal systems) would facilitate public scrutiny of the decisions adopted. 
Understood in this way, participation may be a core element of a composite legal framework, a way to 
refer the authority being exercised back to the different legal orders that regulatory cooperation 
intertwines. At the same time, it could create the conditions to bring contestation within decision-making 
                                                 
107 The Commission’s textual proposal on regulatory cooperation acknowledges this point, strongly now than in 
previous versions is not wholly oblivious to these concerns, as indicated by the annex (“placeholder for provisions 
on the institutional set up for regulatory cooperation under TTIP”). However, these normative considerations should 
be integrated in the model itself, in addition to informing mechanisms of accountability. 
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procedures and to frame deliberations in a way that would be responsive to the normative concerns of 
those legal orders.  
  
